Introduction
In April 2026, I wrote a Medium article about how I don't believe the media is to blame for the political mess we are in. Basically, voters made a choice of which media outlets where they find their "facts." If they became indoctrinated, it was because they chose to be.
https://medium.com/my-unpopular-opinion/im-not-blaming-the-media-for-our-political-mess-4d35bd483e72
Paolo Calvi is a constructive critic of the TDG. He responded to this essay, which resulted in a six-part exchange.
Paolo
Dave, this is a piece that moves in a direction that is anything but obvious-and that, in itself, deserves recognition.
You have deliberately set aside the most convenient scapegoat. The reflex to blame "the media" for political disorder has become almost automatic, and your argument restores a degree of intellectual honesty by relocating responsibility where it more plausibly belongs: within diffuse social behavior, individual cognition, and the structural constraints inherent to journalism as a practice. That is not only a defensible position; it is a necessary corrective to a conversation that has grown increasingly superficial.
There is also, if I may add, a notable editorial clarity in your approach. The piece reads as an attempt to clarify rather than to persuade by simplification-a distinction that is increasingly rare.
Precisely for this reason, however, your argument seems capable of sustaining a further step-one that would not contradict your thesis, but rather extend and strengthen it.
If we accept, as I believe we should, that the problem is not "the media" in the traditional sense, we are still left with a transformation that cannot be ignored: the shift from a system defined primarily by the production of information to one dominated by its distribution. And distribution, in the current environment, is anything but neutral.
What reaches public consciousness today is not merely the result of editorial judgment, but of selection mechanisms optimized for attention rather than for accuracy, coherence, or even relevance. The consequence is a structural amplification of certain types of content-not because they are more informative, but because they are more engaging within the logic of the system.
In that sense, your thesis does not weaken when confronted with this reality; it becomes more precise. The issue is not that media actors have failed in some exceptional way, but that they now operate within an economic and technological framework-the attention economy-that systematically reshapes what is visible, and therefore what is politically consequential.
Framed this way, your argument acquires an additional layer:
the problem is not the media, but the environment in which the media now exist.
And it is at that level that the analysis becomes truly compelling, because it shifts the discussion from moral attribution to structural understanding.
In any case, this remains a thoughtful and well-constructed piece-one that reflects a coherent editorial voice and a cultural posture that is, at present, both uncommon and valuable: the willingness to interrogate prevailing assumptions rather than simply reproduce them.
Dave
Hello Paolo
Thank you for your encouraging words and interesting insight.
If there is a layer to this media misconception, it is the TDG. Let me explain.
In western democracy, voters are expected to consume the media to make their voting choice. As you have alluded in your response, too often they are not consuming the right media--or more importantly they are not seeking contrary positions that could challenge their favorite media.
In TDG, voters are encouraged to vote for someone of good character and capacity for governance. The same two criteria are applied to the elections of the higher tiers. Whether at the neighborhood level or the top tier, voters have worked alongside the credible contenders. The incredible contenders are easily filtered out (and yes, they still get to vote in the TDG elections). The TDG is left with many capable people at the lower and higher tiers.
This is much different than seeking out the positions of each candidate of the many complex issues that face society. Then we cast our X toward the candidate who best lines up with our vision. If that candidate is elected, then we watch him/her closely to make sure he/she is voting the way he/she promised. Political junkies might think this is a good way, but most citizens cannot be bothered with such vigilance. Hence, their vote is influenced by other means, often nefarious.
Good character & capacity for governance! The media will not have big role to play for citizens to find these two qualities. Rather the TDG voting decisions will be based by personal decisions from those citizens working alongside the credible contenders.
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I have an article about Dr. Noam Chomsky and his "Manufactured Consent."
Basically Dr. Chomsky warned us where the media was going to a worse place back in 1988, and it went there.
So what was the point of this book?
https://tiereddemocraticgovernance.org/blog_details.php?blog_cat_id=20&id=255
Paolo
Hello Dave,
"Chasing Noam Chomsky is Futile" is a thoughtful piece, and I think you've engaged with a real tension that is often underestimated: the structural relationship between media systems and democratic decision-making.
The reference to Chomsky is well placed. Manufacturing Consent remains one of the clearest attempts to describe how information flows are not neutral, but shaped by institutional and economic filters.
Where I think the argument could be strengthened further is in how the diagnosis connects to the proposed solution.
The article correctly identifies a structural issue - that media environments can systematically influence how reality is perceived. But the proposed resolution, through the TDG model, seems to operate at a different analytical level.
In other words, a structural problem is being addressed with what is, at least in part, a behavioral or normative solution.
The idea that proximity to candidates (working alongside them, knowing them directly) improves selection is intuitively appealing. But it doesn’t eliminate bias - it reconfigures it:
- from mediated perception to relational dynamics
- from information asymmetry to group effects and reputational filters
More importantly, it raises a question of scale. What may function at a local or network level does not necessarily translate to complex, large-scale systems where decision-making involves layers of abstraction, specialization, and coordination across sectors.
There is also an implicit assumption worth making explicit: that filtering for “good character & capacity” can substitute for institutional design.
Modern political systems have generally evolved in the opposite direction - not because character is irrelevant, but because systems cannot rely on it as a primary stabilizing mechanism. This is where the Chomsky reference becomes particularly interesting.
His analysis does not suggest that the problem of media can be bypassed, but that it is embedded in broader structures - ownership, incentives, access, and power relations. If that is the case, then the question becomes less how to avoid the media, and more how any system - including TDG - would handle the same structural pressures once scaled.
In that sense, your piece opens a valuable line of inquiry. It identifies a real problem, but also points - perhaps implicitly - to a deeper one: how to design systems that remain robust under conditions where information is never neutral.
That, I think, is where the discussion actually begins.
Dave
Paolo
The world did not move forward with Dr. Chomsky's book. It had all the popularity it needed to move the world forward. Something "structurally" is indeed wrong.
The media have their biases. Deadlines and limited space will always force the media to shortchange the "best journalistic practices." At best, we can only hope that they make more good calls than bad calls.
The link between the advertisers and the media is real. Nefarious forces are indeed underfoot, but there is also a business matrix that needs attending. This matrix is the bigger force.
I have offered an alternative to fund the media--to reduce the advertiser link. But that will not eliminate the biases:
https://medium.com/@davevolek/financing-the-new-media-8d582c051522
I also have a new model for commerce, called "The Spolu." Media outlets can be constructed as spolus:
https://davevolekinventions.org/spolu/
Such media outlets will be behave more responsibly--and have the support of many citizens.
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Again when we can move people away from voting by tradition, ideology, rhetoric, charisma, and/or self interest and voting toward good character and capacity for governance, the link between the media bias and the election result will be reduced.
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You have mentioned the problem of scale. Other critics have mentioned this. Let me address this in several ways.
1. Governance is not for the political junkies. Junkies like the drama around politics. The current forum has been indirectly designed for the junkie's entertainment.
Meanwhile, 35% of Canadians do not vote in federal and provincial elections. Many voters are holding their nose. For municipal elections, this goes to 70%.
I believe most people would prefer politics to go to the background. They might still want to participate on certain issues, and the TDG will have mechanisms for them to do.
Many of today's non-voters would like the idea of voting for one of their neighbors--rather than voting for someone they don't know.
2. The TDG is not a quick solution.
It cannot be implemented overnight. New skills have to be learned. New systems will have to be built--and experimented with. The TDG will find its scale.
I estimate it will take 20 years to have a functioning TDG capable of actual governance----------after 1% of citizens decide to start building it.
3. We need to learn how to live democratically (again)
I was a student of Robert's Rules of Order. When I finally understood the social engineering of this set of procedures, I saw its value.
There are three basic features with ROR for small groups to make their decisions:
1) Efficiency (i.e. we do not talk forever to make a decision).
2) The minority has opportunity to present its case.
3) The minority yields to the majority vote.
In many places of western cultures, we have lost the sense of #3. Instead of yielding, the minority continues to fight for their way.
One of the skills for TDG governance is the process of consultation. Basically, the decision makers look to combine their knowledge, experience, and wisdom into one voice. When this unity is achieved, there should not be festering of another idea in the background.
Consultation means accepting our current knowledge, experience, and wisdom is not the final answer. We need the input of others to find the solution that rests beyond any individual’s grasp.
Consultation will not always find that one voice. So the TDG still needs a sense of #3. The minority should let the majority have its way. If the new way works, great. If not, make changes.
More consultative decisions and fewer decisions by vote is something worth striving for.
4. The TDG is not a guarantee
Recall British and American history. In 1688, naysayers said the new British parliament would never work. In 1789, naysayers said the Constitution would never work. Yet . . . .
As another example, the unification of Italy had its naysayers. We are looking at 150 years of these former principalities staying together.
The UK, USA, and Italy have shown that systems can change for the better and these changes can last a long time.
No political change is guaranteed to work. But we need to start somewhere. If we don't start, we get the status quo--or something worse.
I believe the TDG will work because its main players will strive to make it work. The TDG will have the adaptability to find its scale.
Paolo
Hello Dave
Thank you for taking the time to articulate your framework so thoroughly. There is a great deal in your argument that is internally consistent, particularly in how you connect media structure, electoral behavior, and long-term governance design.
If I may, however, I would suggest a shift in perspective that might sharpen the analysis.
It seems to me that many of the issues you describe—media bias, the limited impact of influential works such as those of Noam Chomsky, and the persistence of non-rational voting patterns—are less the result of flawed institutional models per se, and more the consequence of underlying incentive structures.
Modern media systems, for instance, do not merely suffer from bias; they are structurally oriented toward the capture and monetization of attention. Within such a framework, even alternative funding models may alleviate certain distortions, but are unlikely to eliminate the deeper pressures that privilege simplicity, immediacy, and emotional salience over complexity and rigor.
A similar consideration applies to electoral behavior. The aspiration to move voters toward criteria such as character and governing capacity is normatively compelling. Yet empirically, voting behavior tends to reflect bounded rationality, heuristic processing, and adaptive responses to repeated signals. In this sense, the challenge may not be primarily educational, but structural.
With respect to the TDG, I find the emphasis on gradual development both realistic and necessary. The more difficult question, in my view, concerns sustainability at scale. Systems of governance tend to stabilize when they minimize the cognitive and temporal demands placed on participants. Models that require sustained engagement, high competence, and continuous deliberation often evolve toward participation by a relatively narrow and motivated subset of the population—thereby reintroducing, in different form, the very asymmetries they seek to overcome.
Your reflections on consultation are particularly interesting. Deliberative convergence toward a unified voice can indeed be effective in small, cohesive groups. As scale and heterogeneity increase, however, the dynamics of disagreement tend not to disappear, but to reconfigure—sometimes in less visible yet more persistent ways.
Finally, regarding historical analogies: events such as the Glorious Revolution or the adoption of the United States Constitution were not simply institutional successes, but outcomes supported by specific economic, social, and geopolitical conditions. Institutional design alone rarely explains their durability.
For these reasons, the most compelling question your proposal raises is not whether the TDG can function in principle, but how it sustains itself in practice—particularly once initial enthusiasm subsides. In other words, what incentive structures ensure its continuity without requiring an exceptional level of engagement from its participants?
If that dimension can be clarified, the model becomes significantly more robust.
Best regards,
Paolo
Dave's Comments
Paolo's last question posed an interesting challenge. I thought I had answered this question in several ways and in this and other dialogue with Paolo. We were starting to talk in circles, so I decided not to repeat myself (for now) and allow some reflection time. My final response changed direction to finish this particular dialogue.
Dave
Hello Paolo
Thank you for this exchange. It helps me get my ideas together.
I joined Medium in April 2019. I had about 10-15 people asking good questions like you have been asking. I sold some ebooks; others went to the website to read the TDG book. I believe I handled all the questions reasonably well.
Then, in November 2020, Joe Biden got elected. Interest in the TDG disappeared, almost as if the USA was saved. I had only one serious Medium inquiry in that time. Last fall, I had about five people finally, like you, ask some good questions.
In October 2023, an amateur influencer found the TDG and wanted to do an interview. I took the offer. Although I am not a great speaker, I managed to hold things together reasonably well. I think those Medium inquiries of 2019-2020 helped my presentation.
Here is the video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-PyevzQhw3s
While I got some interest last fall from you and a few others, that interest has not reached the level in 2019/20. Not even the reasonably good implementation of Project 2025 is convincing people to look at another way.
Mr. Trump's poll numbers are dropping. A Republican victory in November is unlikely. More importantly, it seems less likely a successful coup will be realized.
The American political left is already dancing in the street. But the system is still broken.
